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LAW, MARRIAGE, AND INTIMATE COMMITMENT 
Milton C. Regan, Jr. * 
INTRODUCTION 
Does society have any interest in the stability of 
marriage per se-that is, apart from any concerns about the 
impact of divorce on children or financially dependent 
spouses? Should law try in any way to reinforce an ethic of 
commitment in marriage as a good in and of itself? 
As an introductory illustration, consider the story of 
Alex and Caitlin. They meet when he is a twenty-seven-
year-old engineer at a telecommunications start-up and she 
is an associate at a law firm. They fall in love. Alex feels 
that Caitlin helps him break through the emotional barriers 
that he constructed to deal with growing up as the oldest 
child in a household with an alcoholic father. Caitlin finds 
that Alex shares her strong political commitments, and that 
he is willing to drop everything and really listen to her 
when something is on her mind. They both believe in 
marriage as an expression of their mutual commitment, so 
they marry, promising to stay together until "death do us 
part." 
Three years later, things do not seem so rosy. Alex 
derives great satisfaction from his work but finds that he 
cannot talk to Caitlin enough about it because she seems 
neither to understand it nor appreciate its importance. 
Indeed, she barely seems able to operate her computer for 
simple word-processing tasks. Furthermore, she displays 
little enthusiasm for his musings about launching his own 
company someday. Caitlin begins to worry that Alex 
possesses neither the sensitivity nor the sense of 
responsibility she had originally thought he had. She feels 
that he spends long hours at work, or in front of the 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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computer at home, engaged in activity that he takes no time 
to explain to her. He finds it difficult to make conversation 
with her colleagues at law firm functions, and recently 
simply stopped going to them. He talks about starting his 
own firm, apparently without any thought to how that 
might make it far more difficult to afford to have children 
any time soon. 
Who became disenchanted first is unclear, as is 
whether one's disaffection is a reaction to the other's 
discontent, or whether either might stay in the marriage if 
the other one relented. In any event, each has come to 
believe that the best thing for them now might be to go 
their separate ways. They have comparable incomes and no 
children. Should we care whether they stay married? If they 
want to end their marriage, should they be able to do so just 
by sending a notice to the county clerk? Is their divorce 
simply their own business? 
Society does have some interest in whether they 
remain married, and in the ease with which they can obtain 
a divorce. I want to explore why some resistance to this 
conclusion exists, and why such resistance is misguided. 
Two social trends make this a timely issue. First is the 
steady erosion of the link between marriage and procreation 
over the last generation. More married couples do not have 
children; 1 more children are born outside of marriage.2 A 
second trend is the rise of unmarried cohabitation over the 
same period.3 This second development requires careful 
thought about whether law should continue to favor 
married over unmarried couples in the provision of many 
state benefits.4 Together, these two trends will soon force 
1 Donna Ruane Morrison, A Century of the American Family, in Cross 
Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and England 57, 
71 (Stanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000). 
2 Larry Bumpass & Nsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and 
Implications for Children's Family Contexts in the United States, 54 
Pop. Stud. 29 (2000). 
3 See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 4 
(April 10,2000), § 6.03, reporter's notes, cmt. A at 36-38. 
4 For an examination of this issue, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated 
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us to confront whether marital stability in itself warrants 
social and legal attention. Put differently, is marital 
disruption a concern only insofar as it might disadvantage 
children or financially vulnerable spouses? Does marital 
stability carry importance for its own sake, or does it just 
serve as a proxy for other more fundamental values? 
I. OF SPOUSES AND PARENTS 
Elizabeth Scott recently described what seem to be 
inconsistent American attitudes toward marriage as a legal 
institution.5 On the one hand, "[m]ost people view lasting 
marriage as an important part of their life plans and take the 
commitment of marriage very seriously.,,6 On the other, 
"any legal initiative designed to reinforce that commitment 
generates controversy and is viewed with suspicion III 
many quarters.,,7 
This skepticism about law's role as a "norm 
manager"g does not extend to all aspects of family life. The 
law has circumscribed parents' authority over their children 
for several decades, subjecting unfit parents to loss of 
custody for egregious violations of legal duties.9 More 
recent legal initiatives have sought to emphasize the 
ineluctable character of financial responsibilities for child 
support, creating significant penalties for those who fail to 
live up to these obligations. io In contrast to some laws 
touching upon the relationship between spouses, these 
Commitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 
Notre Dame Law Rev. 1365. 
5 See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of 
Marriage, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1901, 1902-3 (2000). 
6 Id. at 1902. 
7 Id. 
SId. at 1904; see also Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 
96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 907 (1996). 
9 See Judith Areen, Family Law: Cases and Materials 1326-1421 (4th 
ed.1999). 
10 See, e.g., Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 
(2001). 
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measures generally have enjoyed relatively widespread 
support. I I 
Why do the attitudes differ? Professor Scott 
suggests that using law to promote marital commitment 
generates resistance because of its historical 
interconnection with traditional gender norms. 12 She 
suggests that the use of law to reinforce a norm of marital 
commitment may enjoy the greatest acceptance when its 
design promotes the welfare of children. 13 Examples might 
include a longer waiting period for divorce for those 
couples with minor children than for those without; a more 
stringent standard of review for premarital contracts 
dealing with matters covering children; and lesser 
willingness, in calculating spousal maintenance obligations, 
to impute income to a spouse who is the custodian of minor 
children. 
What about when no minor children are involved? 
Many still support the use of law as a marital norm 
manager, when doing so helps protect a financially 
vulnerable spouse. 14 Efforts to impose responsibility in this 
instance have been less concerted than attempts to enforce 
and formulate guidelines for child support duties. IS 
Nonetheless, heightened attention has developed in recent 
years to the plight of those spouses, most often women, 
who have sacrificed their earning power during marriage 
and thereby are at risk of suffering significant financial 
disadvantage after divorce. 16 The paradigmatic sympathetic 
11 See Scott, supra note 5, at 1904. 
12 Id. at 1962-63. 
13 Id. at 1965. 
14 See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr., Forward to Symposium, Divorce 
and Feminist Legal Theory, 82 Geo. L. J. 2122 (1994). 
IS For instance, "every state now has adopted child support guidelines." 
Areen, supra note 9, at 812. On the other hand, "alimony remains a 
residual category, defined as those financial awards available in 
connection with the dissolution of a marriage that are not child support 
or the division of property." Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 5.0l, cmt. a (American 
Law Institute, Proposed Final Draft, Part I 1997). 
16 See e.g. Allen M. Parkman, No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong? 
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case appears to be the wife in a long marriage, who has 
devoted most of her married life to domestic 
responsibilities, and whose husband seeks to divorce her at 
a time when his earning potential substantially exceeds 
hers. 17 
This example suggests a broader category of cases 
in which use of the law to enforce a sense of marital 
responsibility may garner support: when marital disruption 
is likely to result in harm to those who are vulnerable. This 
category obviously includes divorces in marriages with 
children, but it also encompasses cases involving 
financially dependent spouses. None of this is meant to 
suggest that the law now consistently makes adequate 
provisions for those at serious risk from divorce. Indeed, 
we remain woefully short of this goal. In comparison with 
legal rules that aim to reinforce commitment between 
spouses per se, however, I would argue that legal 
reinforcement of norms intended to protect the vulnerable 
from the impact of divorce is seen as relatively legitimate. 18 
These attitudes are consistent with a cornerstone of 
classical liberal theory: John Stuart Mill's harm principle, 
which stipulates that law should seek to impose other-
regarding norms only when necessary to prevent harm to 
others. 19 
The harm principle, however, does not apply readily 
to Alex and Caitlin, who have comparable financial 
resources and no children. Should we care if they remain 
committed to one another? Even if they did have children, 
and if Alex had a much higher income than Caitlin, 
suppose we could effectively mitigate the impact of their 
divorce on the children and on Caitlin. Would there be any 
reason then to care about their divorce? These scenarios 
35-42, 87-88 (1994); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: 
The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and 
Children in America 342 (1985); see generally Symposium, Divorce 
and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 14. 
17 See generally Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents; Or 
"I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. Leg. Stud. 267 (1987). 
18 Hence, the widespread condemnation of "deadbeat dads." 
19 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 73-91 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). 
HeinOnline -- 9 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 121 2001-2002
2001] Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment 121 
place in sharp contrast a basic question: does society have 
an interest in marital commitment per se, or only insofar as 
its role serves as a vehicle for ensuring financial and 
emotional security for children and economic stability for 
adults? 
Many people probably would say that law should 
not try to reinforce a norm of marital commitment, except 
to protect children or an economically vulnerable spouse. 
Professor Scott asserts that much of the resistance to using 
law to promote an ethos of marital commitment per se 
stems from the fact that such commitment traditionally has 
been gender-coded.2o Norms of spousal selflessness and 
personal sacrifice have been regarded as hallmarks of 
wifely conduct, expressed concisely in Virginia Woolf's 
description: 
She was intensely sympathetic. She was 
immensely charming. She was utterly 
unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts of 
family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If 
there was chicken, she took the leg; if there 
was a draught she sat in it-in short she was 
so constituted that she never had a mind or a 
wish of her own, but preferred to sympathize 
always with the minds and wishes of 
theirs.21 
Those who seek equality between men and women 
not unsurprisingly may fear that what underlies appeals for 
greater marital commitment and sacrifice is a desire to 
return to the traditional expectation that women avoid 
thinking of their own interests.22 Critics point out that the 
20 Scott, supra note 5, at 1961-64. 
21 Virginia Woolf, Professions for Women, in 2 Collected Essays 284, 
285 (1967). 
22 See Katherine B. Silbaugh, One Plus One Makes Two, 4 Green Bag 
2d. 109 (Autumn 2000) (reviewing Milton C. Regan, Jr., Alone 
Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage (1999)). 
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need for women to find a suitable balance between work 
and family almost always characterizes discussions of the 
need for parents to curtail careers for the sake of children.23 
In the same vein, some who work with battered wives 
suggest that only recently have many women mustered the 
courage to leave or resist abusive husbands, in part because 
of self-sacrificing attitudes.24 
There may, however, be an additional explanation 
for resisting legal promotion of marital commitment. This 
is that the powerful companionate model of marriage that 
dominates our era regards marital mtImacy as a 
commitment flowing from the deepest wellsprings of the 
authentic self. On this view, intimate commitment is an 
irreducibly individual act that must remain untainted by the 
coercive power of the state. Any effort to use law to 
reinforce such commitment necessarily deprives it of its 
meaning and legitimacy. This sensibility asserts the 
sovereignty of individuals in determining the terms of their 
intimate relationships. It sees law's role ideally as confined 
to the provision of a mechanism to enforce individual 
agreements between consenting adults, rather than the 
imposition of specific rights and duties applicable to all 
who are married. In short, it regards contract, rather than 
status, as the fundamental paradigm of marriage.25 Anthony 
Giddens notes the analogy of this view to classical notions 
of liberalism. He suggests that it represents the idea of 
"intimacy as democracy," according to which obligation 
23 This reflects what Joan Williams has called the ideology of 
"domesticity." Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and 
Work Conflict and What to Do About It 1-4 (2000). 
24 For analysis of reasons why women stay in abusive relationships, see 
Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of 
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, in Feminism in 
the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 23, 31-
47 (1989); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. I, 10-24 (1991). 
25 On the movement from status to contract in family law, see Milton 
C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 35-42 (1993). 
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depends on the ongoing ability of individuals to determine 
the conditions of their associations.26 
A defense of using law to promote marital 
commitment can square with these premises. As Professor 
Scott argues, short-term pressures can thwart deep 
individual desires for long-term commitmentY Law can 
enhance the ability of individuals to resist these influences 
and attain their long-term goals by sharing the payoff 
matrices for different types of behavior.2 This approach 
takes individual preferences as a given, asserting that 
people have preferences for long-term commitment, and 
that the state should help them realize those preferences. 
On this view, legal reinforcement of commitment norms in 
marriage is consistent with respect for individual autonomy 
in intimate matters. The state maintains neutrality about the 
value of commitment, and confines itself to helping those 
who want to attain it. 
Is the state justified in going beyond neutrality? 
Should it promote intimate commitment as a substantive 
goal worthy of pursuit because of its contribution to human 
flourishing? Because such commitment is in fact a crucial 
activity in realizing the liberal ideal of authentic self-
realization, I argue that it should. However, even if the 
state is justified in seeking to further this good, is 
privileging marital commitment justified as a means of 
doing so? It is, I contend, because marriage provides a 
distinct social form that expresses intimate commitment as 
an impersonal good, whose value transcends the mere fact 
that it is personally chosen. Impersonal legal status thus can 
enhance the ability to realize personal intimacy. The state 
therefore may reasonably attempt to encourage intimate 
commitment as a valuable human good. My argument is 
not that self-realization is the only, or even the most 
26 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in 
the Late Modern Age 89 (Polity Press 1991). 
27 Scott, supra note 5, at 1908-09, 1911; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 
9, 12,38-39 (1990). 
28 See generally Scott, supra note 27. 
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important, value furthered by marital commitment. Rather, 
my claim is that respect for individual autonomy does not 
preclude efforts to use law to reinforce such commitment. 
II. INTIMACY AND AUTHENTICITY 
This section begins with a powerful and 
fundamental norm of modem liberal society: the 
importance of individual authenticity.29 This notion 
involves at least three concepts. The first is the importance 
of self-fidelity-remaining true to one's own uniqueness. 
Each person has her own distinct potential that warrants 
development. Indeed, Kant suggested that every individual 
has a moral duty to develop herself as fully as possible.3D 
As Charles Taylor put it, "Being true to myself means 
being true to my own originality, and that is something 
only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am 
also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is 
properly my own.,,31 In this way, "being in touch [with our 
inner voice] takes on independent and crucial moral 
significance. It comes to be something we have to attain to 
be true and full human beings.'.32 
A second concept is autonomy, which is regarded as 
an especially important value of modem Western life?3 
Voluminous writing on this subject has evolved, which has 
explored its varying refinements, not all of which are 
29 See Isiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism 139-43 (1999); Charles 
Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 13-29 (Harvard Univ. Press 1992); 
Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity 92-95 (1972). 
3D See Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics, in Marcia W. Baron et aI., Three 
Methods of Ethics: A Debate 15-16, 19 (1997). 31 Taylor, supra note 29, at 29. 
32 Id. at 26. 
33 See Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics 120 (4th ed. 1994); see generally Gerald Dworkin, 
Autonomy, in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy 
(Robert E. Goodin & Philip Petit eds., 1993). 
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consistent with one another. 34 For the purposes of this 
article, autonomy should be defined to mean at its core the 
idea that human beings can be self-governing individuals. 
On this view, "I am free when I decide for myself what 
concerns me, rather than being shaped by external 
influences.,,35 The relationship of this ideal to self-fidelity 
should be apparent. One fulfills her unique individual 
potential when her own understanding of that potential and 
what will help realize it govern her life. My choices have 
autonomy to the extent that they rest on this foundation 
rather than on the wishes and expectations of others. 
Finally, individual authenticity involves personal 
integrity. Lynne McFall illustrates the concept of integrity 
in discussing Tolstoy'S story "The Death of Ivan llyich." 
Tolstoy describes llyich's ruminations on his deathbed: 
"It occurred to him that what had appeared 
perfectly impossible before, namely that he 
had not spent his life as he should have 
done, might after all be true. It occurred to 
him that his scarcely perceptible attempts to 
struggle against what was considered good 
by the most highly placed people, those 
scarcely noticeable impulses which he had 
immediately suppressed, might have been 
the real thing, and all the rest false. ,,36 
McFall suggests that llyich's relations to the standards by 
which he had lived his life were: " .. .inauthentic. He simply 
bought 'his' principles wholesale from those around [him]. 
A merely conventional relation to one's principles seems to 
34 For an account of the evolution of autonomy as a core Western 
concern, see generally J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: 
A History of Modem Moral Philosophy (1998). 
35 Taylor, supra note 29, at 27. 
36 Lynne McFall, Integrity, 98 Ethics 5, 6 (1987-88) (quoting Leo 
Tolstoy, "The Death of Ivan Ilyich," in The Short Novels of Tolstoy 
(Aylmer Maude, trans., 1946)). 
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rule out personal integrity. One must speak 'in the first 
person,' make one's principles, conventional or otherwise, 
one's own. ,,37 
To "make one's ... principles one's own" requires 
that those principles guide a person even when they are 
inconvenient or unpopUlar. Integrity thus requires a 
measure of consistency. First, one's values must have 
sufficient consistency so one can live life without values 
that she regards as fundamental frequently pulling her in 
different directions. Second, a person's conduct must 
generally square with her values. If not, then she does not 
genuinely live her life according to her own lights. 
McFall suggests that integrity has both formal and 
substantive conditions. As a formal matter, it requires that a 
person "(1) subscribe to some consistent set of principles or 
commitments and (2), in the face of temptation or 
challenge, (3) uphold these principles or commitments, (4) 
for what the agent takes to be the right reasons. ,,38 As a 
substantive matter, it requires that one's commitments 
relate to something that we regard as of significant value. 39 
Thus, we generally would not say that a wine connoisseur 
demonstrated great integrity in declining to consume a soft 
drink instead of a fine wine with an elaborate dinner. As 
McFall notes, "Resisting temptation is not the only test of 
integrity; the challenge must be to something important. ,,40 
Integrity bears a close relationship to self-fidelity 
and autonomy. A person who seeks to be true to herself 
values integrity because it helps her resist courses of action 
that do not reflect her own deep sense of what will further 
her authentic growth and development. An autonomous 
person seeks to live with integrity because it enables her to 
harmonize her values into principles of self-governance. 
Authenticity and the set of ideals that cluster around 
it clearly require a sense of the continuity and stability of 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 9. 
39 Id. at 9-11. 
40 Id. at 10 (emphasis included). 
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the self over time. The notion that a person must remain 
true to herself, for instance, assumes that she has a self that 
is distinct from any other, a self capable of charting a 
trajectory that permits it to realize its unique potential. 
Ways of realizing this potential may vary in different 
situations. The standard by which alternatives are 
evaluated, however, is drawn not from the exigencies of the 
moment, but from a more stable understanding of the self, 
whose imperative may conflict with the allure of any 
particular course of action. Without such stability, no self 
would exist to which one could be true. Nor is a person 
autonomous if she is simply the plaything of circumstance, 
buffeted about by the vicissitudes and impulses of each 
moment. Such a "radically situated,,41 self is not self-
governing; "external" influences over which she exerts no 
control, rather than her "internal" compass, shape the 
course of her life. 
Finally, integrity demands that a person gIve 
"deliberative priority" to certain principles and 
commitments.42 As Bernard Williams elaborates, "A 
consideration has high deliberate priority for us if we give 
it heavy weighting against other considerations in our 
deliberations. (This includes two ideas; that when it occurs 
in our deliberations, it outweighs most other considerations, 
and also that it occurs in our deliberations).,,43 This 
standard requires the sense that there are some things that a 
person will not do, regardless of their appeal in the 
immediate context, because those thin~ are inconsistent 
with an overarching sense of who she is. 
Without this relatively stable sense of self, no 
criteria would exist with which to evaluate the possibilities 
of each passing moment. As Lynne McFall puts it, "there 
41 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 21 (1982). 
42 Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment: Taking the Personal Point 
of View 38 (1991). 
43 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 183 (1985). 
44 McFall, supra note 36, at 13-14. 
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would be nothing to fear the loss of, not because we are 
safe but because we have nothing to lose.,,45 
Self-fidelity, autonomy, and integrity thus 
contribute to the notion that the individual is the 
protagonist in a narrative that gives a sense of direction and 
purpose to what would otherwise be discrete random 
events. The ability to make and keep commitments is 
critical to the unity of the self over time. A commitment 
represents the deliberate narrowing of future courses of 
action for the sake of a value regarded as integral to the 
kind of person one is. By freely accepting certain 
constraints on the possibilities open to her, a person 
expresses who she is. A person does not simply have 
commitments. Rather, commitments help constitute the 
unique person she is.46 
In this sense, core commitments are, as McFall 
suggests, "identity-conferring.,,47 They "reflect what we 
take to be most important and so determine, to a large 
extent, our (moral) identities.,,48 This definition does not of 
course mean that we are incapable of violating our 
commitments. It does, however, mean that "[t]here are 
things we could not do without self-betrayal and personal 
disintegration.,,49 Furthermore, we may change our core 
commitments over time in light of experience. Both the 
psychological tumult that often accompanies such changes, 
as well as the common statement that one was "a different 
person" when other commitments weighed more heavily, 
reflect, however, the integral part that such commitments 
play in our self-conception. Commitments thus create a 
paradox: they represent constraints on behavior that act as 
the prerequisites for personal freedom. They become 
45 Id. at 20. 
46 See Blustein, supra note 42, at 231 (stating that core commitments of 
persons "are not merely externally related to their self-conceptions. 
They are constituents of their identities ... "). 47 McFall, supra note 36, at 13. 
48 Id. (footnote omitted). 
49 Id. 
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"premises of our agency,,50 in that they make possible the 
sense of identity that enables us to navigate experience with 
a sense of purpose and meaning. 
Among our most profound commitments are those 
to other people. In particular, romantic personal intimacy, 
at least in contempor'"?; Western society, engages identity 
in an unparalleled way. 1 The romantic ethos envisages that 
individuals in an intimate relationship reveal their deepest 
fears, hopes, and dreams in a process of mutual validation. 
This confirmation produces in each person the sense that "I 
am loved for who I am"-that one's unique and authentic 
self is worthy and valuable. As Jeffrey Blustein suggests, 
"Personal love attaches to the particular way in which a 
person instantiates the possibilities of being unique and 
irreplaceable.,,52 Intimacy does not simply validate a pre-
existing self; it also prompts discovery of parts of the self 
of which one previously may not have had awareness. 
Romantic love 
presumes a psychic communication, a 
meeting of souls which is reparative in 
character. The other, by being who he or she 
is, answers a lack which the individual does 
not even necessarily recognise-until the 
love relation is initiated. And this lack is 
directly to do with self-identity: in some 
sense, the flawed .individual is made 
whole.53 
The romantic quest expresses this relationship between 
identity and narrative: it is "an odyssey, in which self-
50 Blustein, supra note 42, at 231. 
51 See generally Ethel Spector Person, Dreams of Love and Fateful 
Encounters: The Power of Romantic Passion 50-72 (1988). 
52 Blustein, supra note 42, at 194. 
53 Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love 
and Eroticism in Modem Societies 45 (1992). 
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identity awaits its validation from the discovery of the 
other."s4 
By virtue of this perceived role in illuminating the 
deepest levels of authenticity, intimate commitment enjoys 
privileged status among the various types of commitments 
that we may make. "The hope for permanent oneness is at 
the heart of romantic love. Though romantic lovers know 
that all emotions are inconstant... they seek a relationship 
that will continue endlessly.,,55 Maintaining such 
commitment thus plays an especially important role in 
fashioning and sustaining a sense of the stability of the self 
over time. For this reason, commitment in general, and 
intimate commitment in particular, is integral to the ability 
of the self to sustain a sense of its own authenticity. 
Commitment serves as a filter for experience that enables 
an individual to assess the meaning and relative importance 
of alternative courses of action, in terms of their 
consistency with those values she regards as central to her 
identity. It allows her to link otherwise successive discrete 
moments into a narrative in which she is the protagonist. 
Commitment reflects the aspirations of the authentic self: 
there does exist a coherent self to which one can be true. 
This self can realize autonomy rather than merely acting as 
a product of contingent circumstances, and can live with 
integrity by harmonizing its values with one another and 
with the exigencies of daily life. 
In short, commitment is a good that society should 
actively promote because of its essential role in realizing 
the deeply-rooted aspiration that individuals lead lives that 
they can call their own. Ironically, however, recognition of 
the close connection between commitment and authenticity 
likely accounts for much of the resistance to using law to 
reinforce norms of intimate commitment. The argument is 
that, in order to be genuine, commitment must reflect the 
deepest emotions of a self who is free from any "external" 
54 Id. (noting romantic love "provides for a long-term life trajectory, 
oriented to an anticipated yet malleable future; and it creates a shared 
history"). 
55 Irving Singer, The Pursuit of Love 66 (1994). 
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social pressure.56 This argument reflects the evolution of 
intimacy toward what Anthony Giddens describes as the 
"pure relationship.,,57 This relationship "is entered into for 
its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from 
a sustained association with another; and which is 
continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to 
deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay 
within it.,,58 The result is the strong conviction that legal 
duties that apply regardless of personal sentiment are the 
antithesis of authentic personal commitment. 
The problem with this view of the relationship 
between law and intimacy is its asocial view of identity. It 
rests on the ostensible contrast between a natural realm of 
personal emotion and an artificial realm of law and 
collective values. In this dichotomy, the first is the domain 
of the authentic; the second of the coercive and inauthentic. 
As the preeminent formal expression of society's demands, 
law necessarily taints any intimate behavior that it 
influences. 
This perspective ignores, however, the ways in 
which the social world shapes individual preferences and 
sentiments, as well as self-understanding. Individuals do 
not formulate their sense of meaning and value in isolation. 
Instead, they operate within a cultural "background of 
intelligibility.,,59 Language, art, myth, and other cultural 
expressions all help to constitute this background. Thus, the 
absence of legal rules does not mean there will be no 
collective influences on mtImate aspirations and 
experience. It simply means that non-legal norms and 
values that the larger culture transmits will have a more 
prominent impact on individual emotional life. As the next 
section elaborates, these influences may make the practice 
of commitment increasingly more fragile. 
56 See Regan, supra note 25, at 46-56. 
57 Giddens, supra note 53, at 58. 
58 Id. 
59 Taylor, supra note 29, at 37. 
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ill. COMMITMENT AND MODERN CULTURE 
Contemporary Western culture is not monolithic. It 
contains a multitude of voices and attitudes, some 
consistent, some in conflict. Nonetheless, certain features 
of modem culture, in combination, tend to make it more 
difficult to sustain a stable sense of self over time. In subtle 
ways, these social influences make commitment more 
tenuous and the construction of a coherent personal 
narrative more problematic. These influences are: (1) a 
sense of "time-space compression" with accelerating 
changes in communications technology;60 (2) the ethos of 
mass consumer society; and (3) the ascendance of flexible 
production methods that introduce more risk and 
impermanence in workplace relationships. Each of these 
forces in its own way threatens to heighten a sense of the 
self as fragmented, because each has the potential to 
undermine the foundations on which individual 
commitment must rest. A legal system that eschews any 
role for law in reinforcing commitment risks leaving 
individuals to their mercy. 
A. Time-Space Compression 
"Time-space compression" refers to the dramatic 
increases in the individual's exposure to stimulation by 
others across time and space.61 Technology such as 
electronic mail, voice mail, fax machines, cell phones, and 
the Internet enhances the possibility of being "present" in 
more than one place at a time while simultaneously 
engaging in multiple activities. Rapidly shifting images in 
entertainment and commercials move us quickly from one 
set of emotions to another with little time to digest and 
reflect upon them. Reality television, talk shows, and 
personal web sites break down a sense of private space, 
making the intimate details of individuals' lives vicariously 
accessible to millions. The result, as Kenneth Gergen 
60 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Cultural Change 240 (1989). 
61 Id. 
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observes, is that "the number and variety of relationships in 
which we are engaged, potential frequency of contact, 
expressed intensity of relationship, and endurance through 
time are all steadily increasing.,,62 With this increase in 
exposure to others comes a multiplication in the possible 
dimensions of the self that may be evoked in any given 
instance. In Gergen's term, we become "populated" with 
the voices and perspectives of others.63 The accelerated 
pace of contemporary life often moves us from one context 
to another, so that a person confronts voices from a number 
of different contexts in rapid succession. The incessant 
demands of these voices will not necessarily be consistent; 
indeed they may well conflict. Each may present an intense 
claim on one's allegiance at any given moment, but that 
allegiance is subject to attenuation when the claim of a new 
voice arrives. A simple example involves a father wishing 
to spend unstructured time with his children, so that his 
identity as a parent is the most salient guide to his actions. 
An email from work that flashes on the screen where he is 
playing a computer game with his children, however, may 
demand that his professional identity come to the forefront. 
This increase in our accessibility to an expanding 
range of others can create difficulty in sustaining a sense of 
personal continuity in one's life as a whole. Individuals 
may lack time or space to digest the flow of events and fit 
them into an overarching narrative; they may lack 
opportunity to do more than respond to each voice on its 
own insistent terms. The predominant experience may be 
"the absolute proximity, the total instantaneity of things, 
the feeling of no defense, no retreat.,,64 In this world, "I no 
longer succeed in knowing what 1 want, the space is so 
saturated, the pressure so great from all who want to make 
themselves heard.,,65 As a result, a "multiphrenic" 
62 Kenneth J. Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in 
Contemporary Life 61 (1991). 63 Id. at 74. 
64 Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, in The Anti-
Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodem Culture 126, 133 (Hal Foster ed., 
1983). 65 Id. at 132. 
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personality may emerge, reflecting fragmentation of the 
self into a variety of discrete allegiances, no one of which 
has any priority over the other. 66 
Under these conditions, the notion of an authentic 
self becomes problematic. That ideal assumes the 
individual's capability to evaluate the demands of the 
moment in light of a relatively stable set of values that 
define her identity. Those values are expressed in 
commitments, which provide some evaluative distance 
from the demands of the immediate present. Achieving that 
distance has become more difficult, however, in a world of 
seemingly incessant stimulation. "[A]s new and disparate 
voices are added to one's being, committed identity 
becomes an increasingly arduous achievement.,,67 Self-
fidelity may be tenuous-to which "self' must one be true? 
Autonomy is problematic, because immediate 
circumstances, rather than an internal compass, seem to 
dictate how the self reacts to each situation. Finally, it is 
difficult to act with integrity because there seems to be no 
standard by which to harmonize either multiple voices or 
one's own beliefs and actions. 
B. Consumerism 
A second feature of modem life that may undermine 
a stable sense of the self and its commitments is the 
prevalence of mass consumer society. The ethos of 
capitalism as portrayed by Max Weber was an emphasis on 
those character traits conducive to the efficient operation of 
the production process: self-restraint, frugality, the 
renunciation of impulse, and the fulfillment of duty.68 Such 
attributes had value in the formation of a stable personal 
character that would allow the individual to succeed in a 
world of large-scale entities organized on the basis of 
rational economic principles. Predictable commitments that 
66 Gergen, supra note 62, at 73-74. 
67 Id. at 73. 
68 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 47-78 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958), 
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provided a relatively stable filter for experience, and a 
fairly predictable life trajectory, in large measure 
constituted that character. 
As Daniel Bell has observed, mass consumerism 
has undermined the salience and attractiveness of those 
character traits.69 The stimulation of consumer demand, 
especially with the advent of widespread credit, required 
overcoming inhibitions on hedonism and responsiveness to 
impulse. It has required that individuals become more 
receptive to-and indeed crave--change and novelty. 
Mass consumption thus generated acceptance of constant 
"social change and personal transformation.,,70 Such 
qualities are crucial if economic overproduction is not to 
become a critical problem. Bell reflects the current 
"disutility" of Weber's Protestant ethic in his observation 
that "[t]he one thing that would utterly destroy the new 
capitalism is the serious practice of deferred 
gratification. ,,71 
The result of this development is that the images, 
metaphors, and self-understandings of the consumer 
experience have become more pervasive and salient ways 
of organizing personal identity. Primarily through the 
efforts of advertising, the public tends to interpret personal 
needs as needs for commodities, equating autonomy with 
consumer choice, and self-fulfillment with consumption. 
Note, for instance, the credit card commercial that itemizes 
the cost of the commodities purchased in order to obtain a 
"priceless" experience. As Michael Schudson has observed, 
"no other cultural form is as accessible to children; no other 
form confronts visitors and immigrants to our society (and 
migrants from one part of society to another) so 
forcefully."n Schudson draws an analogy between 
consumer advertising and the prevalence of religious 
imagery in the French countryside in the nineteenth 
69 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism 65-72 (1976). 
70 Id. at 66. 
71 Id. at 78. 
72 Michael Schudson, Advertising, The Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious 
Impact on American Society 233 (1984). 
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century. While the pervasiveness of this imagery did not 
mean that the average French peasant necessarily was a 
devout Christian, it did mean that "[ w ]hen one thought of 
salvation or, more modestly, searched for meanings for 
making sense of life, there was primarily the materials of 
the Church to work with.'.73 
The significance of the increasing currency of self-
definition as a consumer transcends whatever materialism it 
may inspire. Dissatisfaction and restlessness that pose a 
threat to sustaining commitment subtly characterize the 
phenomenology of the modern consumer experience. First, 
the expectation of constant novelty leads the consumer to 
regard her choices as provisional and impermanent. 
Clothing fashion most notably illustrates this phenomenon, 
but it also exists with respect to items such as automobiles, 
computers, and entertainment systems. The discovery of 
needs that she did not know she had regularly encourages 
her to abandon her past purchases for something new. As a 
result, "[t]he consumption pattern of the moment is 
conceived of not as part of a way of life, but only as a 
temporary adjustment to circumstances. We ex~ect to take 
the first available chance to change the pattern." 4 
The modern consumer therefore exists in a milieu of 
qualified commitment. Indeed, longevity and commitment 
themselves become nostalgic commodities. Pre-faded and 
pre-frayed pants, shirts, and hats, for instance, all offer the 
consumer immediately upon purchase an opportunity to 
convey the image that she wears familiar well-worn 
clothing that has been with her through life's vicissitudes. 
A second salient feature of the consumer experience 
is that it is characterized more by wanting than having.75 
Consumption often seems to provide only temporary 
satisfaction, then disappointment, and then longing for 
other goods or experiences. This is, of course, partly a 
73 Id. at 230. 
74 James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer 
Behavior 26 (1967). 
75 William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problem 
of Needs and Commodities 27 (1976). 
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function of the ethos of novelty. It is also, however, based 
on the nature of the relationship between the modern 
consumer and the products that she consumes. 
Contemporary advertising generally does not aim 
principally to provide information to the consumer so she 
can make a rational choice. Rather, it attempts to create a 
diffuse aura around a product through association with 
certain symbols. The "images and symbolic meanings are 
as much a 'real' part of the product as its constituent 
ingredients.,,76 Advertising creates a relationship between 
consumer and product whereby floating, detached images 
tend to dominate more than symbols with specific referents. 
Modern consumers increasingly inhabit a world defined by 
its own subjectivity-a world made up not of objects with 
definite attributes, but one composed of the dreams and 
desires that they project onto those objects. 
Colin Campbell draws on this dynamic to suggest 
that modern consumers are often caught in a cycle of 
desire, disappointment, and rekindled desire, in which the 
predominant mood is one of 10nging.77 The ambiguity of 
advertising, which encourages the consumer to "attach his 
favoured day dream to this real object of desire,,,78 fuels the 
desire for a commercial product. The act of consumption, 
however, often fails to live up to these fantasies. The 
condensed and highly charged emotions of advertising 
create a standard of personal experience that everyday life 
can only poorly approximate. Desire is rekindled, however, 
as the individual projects her fantasies upon some new and 
different product. As Campbell describes this cycle: "[T]he 
modern hedonist is constantly withdrawing from reality as 
fast as he encounters it, ever casting his day-dreams 
forward in time, attaching them to objects of desire, and 
then subsequently 'unhooking' them from these objects as 
and when they are attained and experienced.,,79 
76 Colin Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modem 
Consumerism 48 (Blackwell 1987). 
77 See generally id. 
78 Id. at 86. 
79 Id. at 86-87. 
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To the extent that individual identity is tied to the 
consumption of objects subject to such a process, the 
instability of that identity threatens to make self-fidelity an 
incoherent concept. Furthermore, the compulsive nature of 
such a cycle thwarts efforts at autonomous self-governance. 
Finally, the ephemeral character of consumer commitments 
erodes a sense of integrity, by depriving the individual of a 
basis for reconciling values and behavior. As such, modern 
consumerism has the potential to hinder attainment of the 
ideal of authentic self-realization. 
C. Flexible Production 
A third feature of contemporary life that may 
weaken commitment and personal stability involves the 
greater influence of a "flexible production" model in 
organizing work life.8o This model has begun to erode the 
organizational preconditions for the virtues of formal 
obligation, self-restraint, and commitment that were 
integral to the formation of the character type that Weber's 
Protestant ethic exemplified. By current standards, at least, 
the older mass production model organized the workplace 
in terms of a relatively fixed production process, standard 
work roles, and seniority-based advancement, all of which 
lent a certain predictability to employment. Work life 
generally consisted of gradual advancement through the 
ranks of a single organization. Such a system made it 
possible for the individual to organize experience in terms 
of a linear narrative, in which the future built recognizably 
on the past.8! This made commitment and deferred 
gratification a coherent strategy, since organizational 
routine provided some protection against abrupt upheavals 
that could render past sacrifice meaningless.82 
80 See generally Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second 
Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (1984); Richard Sennett, 
The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in 
the New Capitalism 46-63 (1998); see also Harvey, supra note 60, at 
121-97 (discussing shift in production from "Fordism" to "flexible 
accumulation"). 
8! Sennett, supra note 80, at 16. 
82 Id. at 43. 
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Increasing reliance on flexible production has 
undennined the material bases for these character traits. 
Such production is designed to respond rapidly to volatile 
changes in consumer demand, seeking to minimize both 
permanence and routine in favor of shifting work 
arrangements that can quickly respond to a new business 
environment. Richard Sennett suggests two notably 
important features of this production model: (1) the 
discontinuous reinvention of institutions and (2) flexible 
specialization.83 
Discontinuous reorganization involves reliance on 
loose networks of workers rather than on pyramidal 
hierarchies, with the ability to create and dissolve teams 
focused on short-term tasks.84 From the worker's 
standpoint, work becomes oriented toward projects instead 
of a particular job with a well-defined location in the 
organizational structure. As Sennett observes, "The system 
is fragmented; therein lies the opportunity for intervening. 
Its very incoherence invites your revisions.,,85 Flexible 
specialization reflects the use of technology to change the 
"weekly and sometimes the daily tasks workers are asked 
to do" in response to changes in market demand.86 Modem 
communications make global market data instantly 
available, computers make it possible to reconfigure and 
reprogram industrial machines, and small work groups are 
positioned for quick decision-making. Such measures 
demonstrate a "willingness to let the shifting demands of 
the outside world detennine the inside structure of 
institutions.,,87 In such a regime, workers are less able to 
build complex skills by incrementally adding to simpler 
ones, but often must "retool" to take on more discontinuous 
tasks. 
The traits that are functional and rewarded in a 
workplace organized along these lines conflict somewhat 
83 Id. at 47. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 48. 
86 Id. at 52. 
87 Id. 
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with the ability to construct a coherent self-narrative 
through the process of making and keeping commitments. 
Sennett suggests that the core admonition of flexible 
production is "no long term.,,88 Persons in this environment 
find detachment and superficial cooperation with temporary 
working groups more useful than permanent loyalty to any 
particular colleague or organization. One must have the 
capacity to let go of the past with relative ease, in order to 
be able to adapt to the next project and the unique 
configuration of skills and personnel that it requires. 
Deferred gratification loses much of its appeal in an 
organizational milieu in which there may be no predictable 
path of advancement, and where there is minimal 
acquisition of skills in a steady and cumulative progression. 
Indeed, "[t]he modem culture of risk is peculiar in that 
failure to move is taken as a sign of failure, stability 
seeming almost a living death.,,89 
Such an environment contributes to a discontinuous 
experience of time, which threatens the sense that work and 
career proceed in linear fashion. With more individualized 
and fluid employment patterns, as well as more volatile 
organizational histories, the past may seem to have only 
tenuous connection to the future. With fewer clearly 
demarcated lines of career progression and an increase in 
loose organizational networks, occupational mobility "is 
often an illegible process,,90 characterized by "ambiguously 
lateral moves,',9} making it difficult to know if one has 
moved up, down, or simply sideways. "Since people who 
risk making moves in flexible organizations often have 
little hard information about what a new position will 
entail, they realize only in retrospect they've made bad 
decisions.,,92 This subjection to increased risk and 
disjointed time lacks the cumulative quality of a narrative,93 
88 Id. at 22. 
89 Id. at 87. 
90 Id. at 86. 
91 Id. at 85. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 25. 
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sometimes thwarting the maintenance of a self who seems a 
stable agent charting a coherent path through recognizable 
territory. The organization of work around temporary teams 
"is flexible and oriented to specific, short-term tasks, rather 
than the reckoning of decades marked by withholding and 
waiting. ,,94 
To the extent that career is a significant element of 
one's identity, the rapid redefinition of work that 
characterizes flexible production may make it difficult to 
sustain a self to whom fidelity can be pledged. New modes 
of production may seem to enhance autonomy by putting 
the worker more directly in charge of her work and career. 
As Sennett notes, however, flexible production provides 
distant managers unprecedented control over all aspects of 
the work process, and permits radical reconfiguration of 
organizations on short notice.95 Mergers, downsizing, and 
reengineering can all threaten a worker's sense that she has 
any autonomy or mastery over the forces .that shape her 
career. Finally, pressure for immediate results and 
attenuated institutional loyalty may complicate the 
harmonization of long- and short-term perspectives on 
which personal integrity relies. 
D. Summary 
In summary, several forces in contemporary life 
contribute to a sense of impermanence and discontinuity in 
everyday experience, creating a world in which the present 
seems vivid, insistent, and unconnected to either past or 
future. The fragmentation of such a world makes sustaining 
commitment and stable identity difficult. Art forms and 
cultural commentary designed to convey skepticism about 
the very coherence of the concept of an authentic self 
reflect this sense of self-fragmentation.96 Frederic Jameson, 
94 Id. at 106. 
95 Id. at 55-57. 
96 See generally Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1970); see also Jean-Fran~ois 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Geoff 
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for instance, suggests that the metaphor of schizophrenia 
may be emerging as an apt account of contemporary 
experience. The schizophrenic, he observes, is "given over 
to an undifferentiated vision of the world in the present," in 
which the various moments of his or her past have little 
connection and in which "there is no conceivable future on 
the horizon.,,97 For those with a sense of relatively distinct 
identity, the present "is always part of some larger set of 
projects which force [one] selectively to focus [one's] 
perceptions.,,98 By contrast, the schizophrenic "is not only 
'no one' in the sense of having no personal identity; he or 
she also does nothing, since to have a project means to be 
able to commit oneself to a certain continuity over time.,,99 
In the same vein, Lawrence Grossberg regards Music 
Television (MTV) as the paradigmatic postmodern art 
form. MTV, he argues, refuses to take anything seriously, 
including itself. This indifferent expression reflects a stance 
of "authentic inauthenticity," which is the view that "[i]f 
every identity is equally fake, a pose that one takes on, then 
authentic inauthenticity celebrates the possibilities of poses 
without denying that that is all they are."lOO One must, of 
course, allow for a certain fanciful hyperbole among 
academics that pronounce the advent of postmodernism. 
Even so, the important point is that technology, mass 
consumerism, and flexible production are all changing 
everyday experience in ways that make such descriptions 
more resonant than ever before. 
Bennington, trans., 1984); see also Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism 
and Consumer Society, in the Anti-Aesthetic, supra note 64, at 114; see 
also Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: 
Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions 42 (1992) (arguing that post-modem 
skeptics "question the value of a unified, coherent subject such as a 
human being, a person, as a concrete reference point or equivalent 
character") . 97 Jameson, supra note 96, at 119. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 119-20. 
100 Lawrence Grossberg, MTV: Swinging on the (Postmodern) Star, 
in Cultural Politics in Contemporary America 254, 265 (Ian Angus & 
Sut Jhally eds., 1989). 
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IV. WHY MARITAL COMMITMENT? 
I began with the question whether, leaving aside 
solicitude for children and financially vulnerable spouses, 
the law should concern itself with commitment between 
spouses per se. I have argued that commitment is a 
substantive good that promotes human flourishing because 
it plays an integral role in realizing the ideal of individual 
self-realization. Intimate commitment is especially critical 
in this process because it can validate in deep ways the 
sense of one's worth as a unique person. Recent social 
developments, however, hamper the ability to sustain 
commitment and the viability of self-understanding in 
terms of relatively continuous identity. The fragmentation 
of experience in modern life can threaten the construction 
of personal narrative, and thus the coherence of an ideal of 
individual authenticity. As a result, rejecting any role for 
law in promoting intimate commitment risks strengthening 
by default the influence of these cultural forces. 
Even if this argument makes the case for promoting 
intimate commitment through law, does it justify 
privileging one particular form of such commitment, i.e., 
marriage? Why make marital status a condition for 
enjoyment of a host of benefits?101 The possible forms of 
intimate commitment comprise a broad range of 
relationships. Why not encourage commitment by 
providing full benefits and protecting individuals in all such 
relationships, not just marriage? 
These questions reflect the notion that the ability to 
choose the terms of intimate relationships gives . such 
relationships their deepest value to the individuals within 
them. On this view, genuine intimate commitment involves 
not assuming an impersonal legal status upon entering a 
traditional social institution, but bestowing meaning upon 
one's relationship with another through the exercise of 
101 For a catalogue of some of these benefits, see David L. Chambers, 
What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of 
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 452-85 (1996); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883-85 (Vt. 1999). 
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sustained choice. This perspecti ve reflects the more 
general modem idea that "our 'values' are our creations, 
that they ultimately repose on our espousing them."lo2 It 
implies that law can reinforce authentic commitment only 
by ratifying the intimate choices that individuals make, not 
by holding up one particular form of commitment as the 
ideal. 
In order for choices to matter, however, the 
indi vidual must choose among courses of action or states of 
affairs that have independent importance. Choice per se 
does not bestow value upon alternatives, nor does it play 
any role in constructing an authentic identity. Rather, 
individuals must choose against the backdrop of a 
"horizon" of significance that delineates what society 
deems valuableYY3 These values are diverse and sometimes 
incommensurable, and a person's choices among them have 
implications for her identity because they reflect her own 
distinctive evaluation, ordering, and attempted 
reconciliation of them. Making difficult choices shapes 
character because it represents confrontation with the pull 
of obligations whose force we cannot control solely by 
ourselves. By contrast, a person for whom things assumed 
value simply by virtue of her own fiat could always 
dissolve any dilemma merely by proclaiming that one of 
the alternatives no longer possesses any significance. As 
Charles Taylor maintains: 
Self-choice as an ideal makes sense only 
because some issues are more significant 
than others. I couldn't claim to be a self-
chooser, and deploy a whole Nietzchean 
vocabulary of self-making, just because I 
choose steak and fries over poutine for 
lunch. Which issues are significant, I do not 
determine. If I did, no issue would be 
102 Charles Taylor, Responsibility for Self, in The Identities of Persons 
281, 289 (Amelie Oskenberg Rorty ed., 1976). 
103 Taylor, supra note 29, at 37. 
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significant. But then the very ideal of self-
choosing as a moral ideal would be 
impossible. 104 
Taylor illustrates the limitations of treating 
individual choice as the source of value in his analysis of a 
Jean-Paul Sartre example meant to demonstrate the 
irreducible significance of choice. Sartre presents the 
dilemma of a young Frenchman during World War II who 
is tom between remaining with his ill mother or joining the 
Resistance to fight the Nazis. Sartre maintains that 
whatever choice the young man makes lies beyond moral 
criticism; the course of action he follows has value simply 
because he has chosen it. The man settles the matter only 
by a "radical choice" that expresses and helps constitute 
who he is. 105 
Taylor argues that the young man feels within the 
grip of a moral dilemma because there is a relative 
consensus that each of the claims that he confronts exerts a 
genuine moral pull-that they each stand for something 
that human beings regard as valuable. 
On one hand his ailing mother who may 
well die if he leaves her, and die in the most 
terrible sorrow, not even sure that her son 
still lives; on the other side the call of his 
country, conquered and laid waste by the 
enemy, and not only his country, for this 
enemy is destroying the very foundation of 
civilized and ethical relations between 
men. 106 
The man would not feel pulled in two different directions-
regard himself as facing an agonizing dilemma-if there 
104 Id. at 39; see also McFall, supra note 36 (when we regard a person 
as having integrity, her principles or commitments must be taken to be 
those that a reasonable person would regard as of great importan~e). 
105 Taylor, supra note 102, at 290. 
106 Id. 
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were not this widespread sense that each alternative has an 
intrinsic value that is independent of the fact that he may 
say that it is important. The conviction that what one cares 
about has impersonal value-that its genuine worth and 
importance as an object of human concern will endure lon~ 
after one is gone-must therefore sustain personal value. 10 
As Stephen Darwall puts it, "[t]hat which endows our life 
with meaning must be something whose value we regard as 
self-transcendent." 108 
For intimate commitment to constitute identity, it 
must therefore present an image of something that derives 
its value from a source outside the self s choice to engage 
in it. It requires, in other words, social validation. The legal 
institution of marriage plays an especially significant role 
in providing such validation for the value of commitment, 
bestowing a formal legal status on partners is a basis for 
impersonal rights and obligations. Those who marry 
participate in a public ritual that marks entry into a social 
institution intended to embody the value of intimate 
commitment. That institution transcends any specific 
couple who may be a part of it and has a history that dwarfs 
any couple's particular experience. It offers a reasonably 
coherent set of expectations and traditions concerning 
commitment that aid in the construction of a narrative 
identity, both for each partner and for the couple together. 
This role of marriage is reflected in the fact that 
many gay and lesbian critics argue that denying same-sex 
couples the right to marry is injurious precisely because it 
deprives such couples of this social acknowledgment of the 
value of their intimate commitments. Partners in such 
relationships are left to their own devices in cultivating a 
sense of the importance of the choices they make. As one 
lesbian in a permanent relationship has written: 
We had not had a wedding. Aunts and 
uncles did not come to visit and admire our 
107 See Blustein, supra note 42, at 42-60. 
108 Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason 165 (1983). 
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home. We never received anniversary cards. 
As trivial as these things may seem, they 
represent something vitally important: 
heterosexual couples are encouraged to stay 
together. Their union is celebrated and 
shared with loving and supportive families 
and friends. 109 
Lawrence Blum's concept of "role morality" 
suggests the way in which marital status combines elements 
of personal and impersonal value. 11O Those who identify 
with the values and ideals of a role have "a sense of 
personal engagement that helps to sustain the individual in 
her carrying out" the role's obligations. 111 This sense of 
engagement means that the moral pull a role exerts is 
experienced not simply as an external limitation on the 
pursuit of individual interests. Rather, it is regarded as 
"implicated in the individual's own sense of personal 
values.,,112 In this way, adherence to role morality is a form 
of self-realization. At the same time, those values are not 
purely personal ones that derive their meaning solely from 
their place within an individual's set of ends. As Blum 
suggests, in the case of a person guided by role morality, 
"[t]he ... agent does not take herself to be pursuing a goal 
simply because of its value to her. Rather, [she] takes 
herself to be responding to a value outside of herself, 
following (what she takes to be) its dictates.,,113 In short, a 
well-defined social role such as marriage can evoke 
personal identification with impersonal value, meaning that 
spouses can find a measure of self-fulfillment from acting 
109 Patricia F. Singer, Ellen and Debbie: A Lesbian Couple and Their 
Commitment, Wash. Post, May 27, 1991, at C5. 
110 Lawrence A. Blum, Vocation, Friendship, and Community: 
Limitations of the Personal-Impersonal Framework, in Identity, 
Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology 173, 178 (Owen 
Flanagan & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990). 
III Id. at 179. 112 Id. at 180. 
113 Id. at 181. 
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in accordance with a general moral norm of commitment in 
marriage. 
This is not to say that the tradition of marriage is 
unproblematic. In particular, of course, gender norms 
continue to influence many couples' understandings of 
what marriage entails. 114 These norms create asymmetries 
of power between husbands and wives, and can leave 
women financially vulnerable at divorce. Neither, however, 
is the tradition of marriage static. The intensely 
companionate model of marriage so influential in our era, 
for instance, emerged only over the last three hundred years 
or so, and did so at different rates among different social 
classes. 115 Many couples now aspire to, although fewer 
achieve, an egalitarian marriage that avoids reliance on 
conventional gender assumptions. 116 To the extent that 
couples with such an aspiration are unsuccessful, the birth 
of a child likely does far more to reinforce traditional roles 
than does marriage per se. Furthermore, claims for 
recognition of same-sex marriage have sparked a vibrant 
debate about just what core values marriage serves, 
especially in light of a looser connection between marriage 
and procreation. ll7 An historical perspective thus reveals 
that, while long-term commitment has been a relatively 
constant feature of marriage, perceptions of the purpose of 
that commitment have varied over time. 
As David Chambers has suggested, were we writing 
on a clean slate, promoting commitment by favoring the 
"two-person enduring union" over other social relationships 
might not necessarily be the most desirable practice. I 18 As 
Chambers observes, however, "after thousands of years of 
114 See generally Williams, supra note 23; EJ. Graf, What is Marriage 
For? (1999). 
115 See Singer, supra note 55, at 67-69; see generally Lawrence Stone, 
The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800 (1977) (abridged 
edition). 
116 See generally Pepper Schwartz, Love Between Equals: How Peer 
Marriage Really Works (1994). 
117 See Williams, supra note 23, at 30. 
118 Chambers, supra note 101, at 448. 
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human history, the union of two persons in a relationshiR 
called 'marriage' is almost certainly here to stay." 1 
Throughout the world "marriage is the single most 
significant communal ceremony of belonging.,,120 This 
historical resonance makes it a powerful vehicle for 
expressing the independent value of commitment. By 
entering a social institution that has endured over numerous 
generations, individuals orient themselves within a distinct 
cultural narrative in which self-realization is linked with 
intimate attachment. 
CONCLUSION 
My primary objective in this paper has been to 
argue that the state is justified in promoting marital 
commitment as a substantive good. My argument does not, 
however, necessarily lead to specific conclusions about 
particular legal provisions. I will conclude by briefly 
touching upon three aspects of law for which my claim may 
be relevant. First, I would contend that it is appropriate for 
the law to provide more benefits to married than to 
unmarried couples as one way of encouraging commitment. 
It is far less plausible today for unmarried couples to 
maintain that they avoid marriage because they desire to 
avoid the legal burdens the status imposes. Recent years 
have witnessed the demise of many legal obligations 
premised on marriage, the decline of provisions supporting 
traditional gender roles within marriage, and the increasing 
willingness of courts to provide for the distribution of 
financial assets between unmarried persons when their 
intimate relationship ends. 121 This makes more plausible 
than ever the assumption that many who do not marry 
avoid it because they are wary of the symbolic commitment 
that marriage represents. Some support for this view comes 
from the fact that unmarried couples break up more 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 450. 
121 See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millenium, 33 
Fam. L.Q. 647, 652-59 (1999). 
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frequently than married couples divorce, and that their 
relationships are briefer. 122 If willingness to marry does 
represent greater mtImate commitInent, society is 
warranted in expressing its approval of this institution by 
treating married and unmarried couples differently. 
I am wary of domestic partner legislation at least 
insofar as the benefits that it provides begin to approximate 
those available to married couples. Such a regime that 
rewards multiple models of intimacy risks diluting the 
influence of marriage as the preeminent social symbol of 
intimate commitment. It implies that commitment is a good 
that derives its value ultimately from individual choice, 
rather than from its intrinsic worth, so that varying degrees 
of commitment all have equal value. For same-sex couples, 
who cannot marry, benefits can be a humane and pragmatic 
way of acknowledging the importance of these 
relationships in a social climate that may be hostile to 
same-sex marriage. Ultimately, however, we should extend 
the ability to marry to same-sex couples whose partners 
wish to make a public commitment to each other. Aside 
from the importance of this step to gay men and lesbians, 
the inability to structure these marriages along gender lines 
would provoke healthy debate about the role and functions 
of marriage. 123 
A second legal development that raises some issues 
relating to my theme is covenant marriage. By making it 
possible for spouses to agree to a more demanding standard 
for divorce than is currently available, law may provide the 
social support that individuals need to maintain a sense of 
the importance of marital commitment. Widespread 
adoption of this alternative could help reverse what some 
see as an attenuation of this norm. At the same time, 
however, covenant marriage could diminish the ability of 
marriage to reinforce this norm by fragmenting the clarity 
of the message that marriage sends. What would it mean to 
122 See generally Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in 
Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. Marr. & Fam. 913 (1991). 
123 See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist 
Inquiry, 1 L. & Sexuality 9 (1991). 
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say "I do" in a society in which the option to say "I really 
do" also is available? Would "regular" marriage be seen as 
a lesser commitment than covenant marriage-a sort of 
"marriage lite?" Might this eventually lead to default rules 
that reflect only a minimal norm of commitment, on the 
theory that those who want more can always provide for it? 
Such a development would reflect a move from status 
toward contract as the primary source of intimate 
commitment. Would this begin to deprive marriage of its 
effectiveness in conveying the sense that intimate 
commitment is a good with intrinsic value to human 
flourishing? 
Finally, what about a two-tiered system of divorce, 
with more stringent requirements for divorcing couples 
with minor children than those without? The rationale for 
such a regime obviously stems from a concern about the 
impact of divorce on children, rather than about marital 
stability per se. As such, two-tiered divorce might be part 
of a shift from marital status to parental status as the 
organizing concept in family law Y There is much to be 
said for greater sensitivity to the importance of a norm of 
marital commitment for children, and to the ineluctability 
of parenthood as a source of family obligation. We must be 
careful, however, not to conclude that the stability of 
marriages without children therefore is of little concern. 
Intimate commitment between adults is important because 
of its contribution to a stable sense of identity and its role in 
preserving individual autonomy and integrity as coherent 
ideals. A legal system that imposes minimal and casual 
standards of divorce for childless couples risks 
undermining preconditions for the very individuality that 
critics invoke in resisting the use of law to reinforce marital 
commitment. 
Sensitivity to the value of marital commitment per 
se does not lead automatically to calls for specific legal 
provisions. It does, however, suggest a dimension to which 
we should be sensitive when considering legal regulation of 
124 See generally June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second 
Revolution in Family Law (2000). 
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marriage. If marriage does indeed become less important as 
a conceptual foundation for family rights and obligations, 
we need to be aware of what we may risk losing if we treat 
it as but one among several coequal intimate relationships. 
In order to do this, we need to think deeply about why we 
should care about marriage at all. 
